AGNTCon + MCPCon Japan 2026

As autonomous agents move from experimental scripts to production systems, we’re exposing a massive flaw in how they’re built. We are giving LLMs the power to execute code, access files, and make network requests—essentially turning them into untrusted programs with direct authority over our infrastructure.

Prompt injection isn’t just a model quirk; it’s an open door to a massive attack surface. The moment an agent processes untrusted data, that input can hijack generated code, trigger outbound requests, and lead to data leaks or Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Without proper guardrails, a highly capable agent is just a friendly interface over a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability.

This session reframes the entire security challenge. Instead of wasting time trying to make the model perfectly "safe," we’ll look at how to design infrastructure that stays secure even after the agent is compromised. By enforcing strict policy gates, we ensure that even if an agent is hijacked, it cannot access secrets, traverse your network, or execute privileged actions.